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Abstract
Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s assertion that female judges might be “better” than male
judges has generated accusations of sexism and potential bias. An equally controversial
claim is that male judges are better than female judges because the latter have benefited
from affirmative action. These claims are susceptible to empirical analysis. Primarily
using a dataset of all the state high court judges in 1998-2000, we estimate three
measures of judicial output: opinion production, outside state citations, and co-partisan
disagreements. We find that the male and female judges perform at about the same level.
Roughly similar findings show up in data from the U.S. Court of Appeals and the federal
district courts.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s controversial suggestion, prior to her elevation, that

women are better judges than men ignited an inferno of criticism in the months leading
up to her confirmation hearings, and she backed away from it.1 But she may well have
believed it, and certainly she said it on numerous occasions to what we suspect were
receptive audiences. The claim contradicts a more familiar notion that presidents and
other elected officials must engage in affirmative action favoring women in order to
ensure that the judiciary has a sufficient mix of women and men. The pool of people
from whom judges are normally taken—middle-aged lawyers—contains many more men
than women, because twenty years ago more men than women attended law school, and
because in the intervening years more women than men have abandoned prestigious legal
positions in order to take care of children or pursue other opportunities. If the federal
judiciary is to contain a respectable proportion of women, politicians will have to appoint
women who are less qualified than men. Then-Judge Sotomayor’s claim that, because of
their backgrounds, women are better judges than similarly qualified men, implies that
presidents do not appoint less competent women but merely engage in a kind of statistical
reverse discrimination by treating femaleness as a proxy for judicial quality.
The idea that women might be better judges than men, or at least as good as men,
represents a radical break from taken-for-granted assumptions of the recent past. Female
judges were rare before the 1970s (Schafran 2005). In 1977, Rose Bird was the first
woman appointed to the California Supreme Court (Purdum 1999). In 1980, fourteen
1

The statement that received the most attention was one made by Judge Sotomayor in 2001 at a conference
at Berkeley, where she said that ““I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that
life.” (Lithwick 2009). A prior statement, in 1994, was broader and said that “women” judges might reach
“better” conclusions. (Dickerson 2009).
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women sat on state high courts among several hundred men (Curriden 1995). Sometime
after that the political establishment decided that women should have greater
representation on the courts. By 1995, over fifty female judges had joined the state high
courts (Curriden 1995; Songer & Crews-Meyer 2000). In the period from 1998 to 2000,
over 100 women sat on the state high courts, roughly a quarter of the total.2 The federal
courts similarly witnessed a dramatic increase in the fraction of female judges the past
two decades (Hurwitz & Lanier 2008).
Much of this change no doubt resulted simply from the increasing numbers of
women who have entered the legal profession since the 1970s. But there is little doubt
that politicians engaged in affirmative action, in the sense of giving preference to female
candidates who are less qualified than men on the basis of standard measures, such as
length of time in the profession. In general, women serving on state high courts starting
in the late 1990s went to law school in the mid 1970s, where they were the distinct
minority in law schools and in the legal profession. In addition, the women who were
eligible for the judgeships we study may have been subject to gender discrimination
during their careers, thus narrowing the pool of available female judge candidates further.
If there is a smaller pool of women from which to select judges (compared with the pool
of potential male judges), then forcing the selection of a substantial number of women
may result in more qualified men getting passed over (compared with female candidates),
thereby reducing overall court performance.3 We will discuss the evidence in detail
below; for now, the clearest evidence is that, in the dataset of state high court judges we

2
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From our dataset.
For complaints about Judge Sotomayor’s nomination along these lines, see Buchanan 2009; Shapiro 2009.
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use in this paper, women practice for 21 years on average before becoming judges,
whereas men practice 26 years on average before becoming judges.
A number of rationales can be given for affirmative action for women. One such
rationale is political.

If women voters believe that female judges understand and

represent their perspectives better than do male judges (the “differential perspectives”
view), they will demand more female judges and, as a result, politicians will cater to
those interests (Solowiej, Martinek & Brunell 2005).

Another rationale is that the

addition of women to the decision-making mix improves the quality of group decisions.
Greater diversity of perspectives can protect against groupthink and can add new
information to the decisional calculus (Martin 1990; Farhang & Wawro 2004; Massie et
al. 2002). Some suggest, for example, that the presence of a woman judge on a court can
alter (and maybe improve) the decision making of her male colleagues (Songer & CrewsMeyer 2000; Peresie 2005). Yet another perspective suggests that female judges bring
value as role models (Tacha 2007; see Mansbridge 1999 for a more general argument).
The bulk of the literature on gender and judging examines what we call the
“differential viewpoints” question.4 This literature focuses on the subject areas where
female judges are likely to bring a distinctive perspective to bear. The most prominent
finding is that female judges are more likely to favor plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases
4

See Beiner 1999; Davis 1993; Sherry 1986. Empirical research in this area has asked whether there are
systematic variations in the outcomes of cases in certain areas due to the different perspectives women
bring to the bench arising from their gender and likely different life experiences (Davis 1993; Allen & Wall
1993). Scholarship has examined whether female judges rule differently in subject areas perceived to
involve women’s issues or areas where women’s supposed liberal leanings will make a difference, such as
criminal law matters (Songer et al., 1994; Jackson 1997; Martin & Pyle 2000; Stribopoulos & Yahya 2007).
Some early research that looked at differences in criminal dispositions, among other things, found few
differences (Kritzer & Uhlman 1977; Gruhl at al. 1981; Walker & Barrow 1985) but recent work has found
some gender differences in sexual harassment and discrimination cases (Davis et al. 1993; Peresie 2005;
Boyd, Epstein & Martin 2007). Although the overall picture is unclear (Palmer 2001), the general story
appears to be that female judges support the rights of women more strongly than do their male colleagues
(Martin & Pyle 2005; McCall & McCall 2007; McCall 2008).
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(Peresie 2005; Boyd, Epstein & Martin 2007). This result does not, however, cast light
on whether female judges are better or worse than men. The empirical research has not
established that the female judges are legally correct in these cases; it is possible that
those plaintiffs should have lost.
Our focus is on the relationship between the gender of judges and judicial
quality—the question raised by the affirmative action issue. Drawing on our prior work
on judicial quality, we focus on opinion publication, citations, and disagreements with
co-partisans (reflecting judicial independence) as metrics of judicial performance. Using
three datasets—justices sitting on the highest courts of the fifty states from 1998 to 2000,
federal district judges from 2001 to 2002, and federal appellate judges from 1998 to
2000—we test the hypothesis that female judges are worse (or, as Justice Sotomayor
claimed, better) than men. We find no evidence for this hypothesis.
2.

PREDICTING GENDER DIFFERENCES
One of the distinctive characteristics of U.S. courts, as compared to their

European and Asian counterparts, is that judges come to the bench later in life, roughly
around age fifty, after significant experience outside the judiciary. The aggregation of
these prior experiences constitutes a judge’s human capital—in effect, her training to
become a judge. A lawyer with more legal experience should be a better judge than a
lawyer with less legal experience. In addition, attending a better law school should,
theoretically, provide better training for the tasks associated with judging.

Further,

because judicial candidates coming to the bench have a major portion of their
professional career behind them, they have likely passed through numerous selection
screens already.

4

These factors suggest two opposite sets of predictions. Under what we call the
Preference Story, women who are less qualified than men are selected to be judges, with
the result that female judges perform less competently than do male judges.

Our

empirical tests focus on the Preference Story, which has support in the literatures on
lawyers and women. Under the Screening Story, pre-judicial barriers to entry—including
sex discrimination and employment conditions that are hostile to the needs and interests
of women—screen out less competent women. If the pool of women is smaller than the
pool of men, the women who remain in that pool after the informal screening are higher
quality than the men. The Screening Story implies that female judges should be as
competent as, or more competent than, male judges.
2.1 The Preference Story
2.1.1. Women Law Students and Lawyers
Research on gender and legal education suggests that women have a lower quality
experience in law school than do their male colleagues.

They participate less in

classroom discussion, feel more alienated, and underperform in terms of the traditional
indicators of success in law school such as grades, law review membership, and
publications (Banks 1990; Guinier, Fine & Balin 1997; Mertz, Njogu & Gooding 1998;
Yale Law Women 2001-02; London, Downey & Anderson 2007; Mertz 2007; Leong
2009). In addition to formal legal training, law schools also provide students with entry
into a network of contacts. If female students are disproportionately excluded from social
networks among students, faculty, and alumni, then female students receive less value
from their educations (Iskander & Bashi 2003).

5

This pattern of limited access continues at the next stage, early legal employment.
The jobs that students take in their early years are disproportionately likely to be in the
private sector, both because there are more of these jobs than in the public sector and
because many public sector jobs require legal experience.5 These initial jobs in the
private sector, according to what recruiters tell students, are supposed to provide both onthe-job training and a network of contacts (Garth & Sterling 2009). Research on the
operation of private law firms, particularly the large ones, however, suggests that these
firms do not provide equal amounts of training and networking opportunities (Garth &
Sterling 2009). Much of the work is routine and done in relative isolation. Work that
provides training and client contact is scarce and given out to those deemed most likely to
succeed in the law firm tournament (Wilkins & Gulati 1996; 1998). It is likely that those
who succeed in making partner at these firms are the ones who receive the better training
and networking opportunities. Scholars have found that women succeed at private firms
at lower rates than men (Epstein 1993; Kagan 2006; O’Brien 2006; Leber 2009). One
explanation for this lack of success is that firms assign women to more of the routine
work and offer them fewer of the scarce training and networking opportunities.6
2.1.2. Female judges
Our statistical analysis focuses on judges in the late 1990s, who for the most part
went to law school in the 1970s or before. As of the early 1970s, the fraction of women

5

In addition to private practice job disparities, men and women have uneven rates of clerkships. Judicial
clerkships are among the most elite jobs out of law school, supposedly providing the best training. Extant
research has found that women are less likely than their male counterparts to obtain an elite clerkship (Kaye
& Gastwirth 2008).
6
A key element of the dynamic here is thought to be the difficulty that women have in finding mentors
who can transfer tacit knowledge (Garth & Sterling 2009). The causal mechanism here does not have to
involve explicit discrimination. Rather, if women are perceived as having a lower likelihood of success at
these firms--perhaps because of stereotypes--then the firms’ partners may not invest as much in training
women associates.
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in law schools was in the 10-20% range (Epstein 1997; Savage 2009). Because women
in this cohort likely dropped out of law at a greater rate than men to care for family
members or pursue other opportunities, the effective pool of women qualified for
judgeships was probably even smaller by the 1990s. Despite the relatively small pool of
potential female judges, the fraction of female judges in our dataset of state high court
judges from 1998 to 2000 was 24.1%. Under the preference story, the disproportionate
selection of women judges—given the lower training among women attorneys both at
law school and in their early employment—leads to lower qualified judges.
Finally, there is the matter of discrimination women might face after they become
judges. A series of reports produced by gender bias task forces around the country
starting approximately two decades ago suggested the presence of bias against women
participating in the judicial system at multiple levels (Resnik 1996; Kearney & Sellers
1996, provided overviews). Some of that bias has been toward female judges where
some female judges report getting less respect from colleagues, court staff and lawyers.
If that is the case, female judges probably have to expend greater effort than their male
colleagues to get their views heard and requests fulfilled (Barteau 1997, Mississippi Task
Force Report 2004; Pennsylvania Task Force Report 2008). Justice Ginsburg recently
observed:
It was a routine thing [in the past] that I would say something and it would
just pass, and then somebody else [who was male] would say almost the
same thing and people noticed. I think the idea in the 1950s and ’60s was
that if it was a woman’s voice, you could tune out, because she wasn’t
going to say anything significant. There’s much less of that. But it still
exists, and it’s not a special experience that I’ve had. I’ve talked to other
women in high places, and they've had the same experience (Bazelon
2009).

7

Research from other professional settings suggests that women sometimes get stuck with
disproportionate shares of administrative burdens; this might occur on the courts as well
(Worrell 2001). The prospect of bad working conditions might deter more qualified
women (with a resulting higher opportunity cost) from pursuing or accepting
judgeships—further diminishing the quality of women judges. The possibility of
discrimination also suggests caution in interpreting statistical results: highly qualified
female judges could perform worse than men because their working conditions are
harsher.
2.1.3. Women, Risk Aversion and Conflict Avoidance
The third body of literature relevant to our predictions concerns women generally,
as opposed to women lawyers or judges. Multiple studies find that women display a
greater degree of risk aversion than do men (Levin, Snyder, & Chapman 1988; Powell &
Ansic 1997; Jianakoplos & Bernasek 1998; Sunden & Surette 1998; Schubert et al. 1999;
Halek & Eisenhauer 2001; Powloski & Atwal 2008; Corrigan 2009). Women are also
found to be less competitive, more conflict averse and less prone to aggression than are
men (Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999; Campbell, Muncer & Bibel 2001; Gneezy, Niedele
& Rustichini 2003; Croson & Gneezy 2008). In addition, some research shows that
women find risky situations more stressful than men (Kerr & Vlaminkx 1997), while men
tend to be overconfident and more willing to take risks (Barber & Odean 2001;
Bengtsson, Persson & Willenhag 2004).
The implications of these studies for judicial performance generally are
ambiguous. For example, risk-averse judges might be better because they take greater
care with their opinions, or worse because they fear offending colleagues or powerful
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people.

That said, there are implications for certain specific aspects of judicial

performance, such as the willingness to openly disagree with a co-partisan. The literature
suggests that judges do not dissent lightly. The presence of a dissent not only brings
additional scrutiny by bringing outside attention to a disagreement among court members,
but also creates additional work for all the judges because they have to do more to justify
their positions (Posner 2008).

As a result, judicial colleagues can sometimes take

umbrage at dissenting behavior (Posner 2008). A number of courts appear to have strong
norms disfavoring dissents (Brace & Hall 2005). Risk-averse and conflict-averse judges,
therefore, are likely to dissent less; and particularly so with those on their team (co
partisans). A caveat here is that some studies of professional women suggest that the
effects of training and selection can remove some of the gender differences mentioned
above (Croson & Gneezy 2008).
2.2. The Screening Story
The Screening Story predicts that female judges will either outperform or do no
worse compared with their male colleagues. The argument rests on selection effects.
Women lawyers, at every stage, starting in law school, have had higher barriers to cross
than their male counterparts. The fact of the higher hurdles that face women means that
many more women will fail to cross the hurdles than men. However, the women who do
succeed in crossing the higher hurdles and make it to judicial selection will likely be
more capable than their male counterparts who had to cross lower hurdles to get to the
same stage. In a discussion of Judge Sotomayor’s comments, Dahlia Lithwick, drawing
from research in anthropology, speculates as to whether female judges, have had to learn
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to understand both male and female perspectives during their careers. By contrast, male
judges have probably not had to learn the female perspective (Lithwick 2009).
In contrast to the Preference Story, one might not expect the women in the
Screening Story to be risk averse or conflict averse. Given the hurdles they have had to
clear, those women that remain probably have a greater inclination toward taking risks
and enduring conflicts in order to succeed. Further, having had to succeed in male
environments probably might mean that these women are not primarily interested in
certain “women’s” topics such as family law. Instead, they are probably interested in,
and adept at, tackling a wide range of issues.
2.3. Data and Measures
Our dataset has information on several objective metrics of judicial performance
for all the sitting state high court judges in the U.S. for the years 1998-2000. There are
409 judges, of whom 103, or 25.18% are female. For each of these judges, we collected
data on three separate measures, including the number of published opinions, the
numbers of citations from outside the state (that is, non-precedent driven citations), and
open disagreements (dissents) with those from the same political party background (our
measure of judicial independence). Others have questioned the value of the objective
measures and some have suggested alternate measures (Cross & Lindquist 2009; Baker,
Marshall & Feibelman 2009; Stith 2009).

For purposes of this article, we tie our

predictions of gender differences to the objective measures as opposed to general notions
of quality. While the measures are rough, we have found in other work that they are
correlated with other factors in a theoretically sound way (Choi, Gulati & Posner 2009a,
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2009b, 2009c)7 and so provide at least a starting point in assessing gender differences in
judicial quality. We also assume that the inadequacies of our objectives measures are not
a function of gender, allowing us to assess how men and women perform differentially on
our measures.8 In analyzing the results, we control for variations among the states.
2.3. Predictions
The predictions below are simplified hypotheses based on the Preference Story.
2.3.1. Opinion Publication Rates
Publishing an opinion, as opposed to issuing an unpublished disposition, we
assume, takes greater effort (Choi, Gulati & Posner 2009a). Further, the designation of
the opinion as published brings greater external scrutiny and, therefore, greater risk of
criticism. We predict under the Preference Story that female judges will publish fewer
opinions than their male colleagues because they are likely to have received lower
amounts of legal training and are more likely to be risk averse. The Selection Story
provides the opposite prediction—women judges should publish either more or at least no
fewer opinions compared with male judges.
The publication of an opinion gives it greater precedential weight. If women are
more interested in advancing the law in certain areas, they will focus their publication
efforts in those areas. We predict that women will publish more opinions in areas such as

7

For example, elected judges and appointed judges differ in a systematic way. In addition, judges close to
retirement are less productive and judges with more court experience are more productive. (Choi, Gulati &
Posner 2009a).
8
At more than one faculty workshop, we have been asked whether one of our measures, citation counts,
was subject to gender bias. The point being that female judges might receive fewer cites because men will
be more likely to cite each other. This is likely to be the case if the men hold negative stereotypes of the
women or have networks of reciprocal citations from which women are excluded. In a different article,
using a dataset of federal appeals court judges, two of us examined this question and found no indication of
gender bias (Choi & Gulati 2008). But, should such a bias exist here, it would strengthen our conclusions.
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family law and civil rights (which includes sex discrimination and sex harassment) and
fewer opinions in business law.
2.3.2. Citations
Citations by outside authorities are a commonly used measure of influence
(Landes, Lessig & Solimine 1998). We have data on citations by a variety of outside
actors including other state courts, the federal courts outside the relevant circuit and law
reviews.

Citations to judicial opinions have been described as measuring multiple

characteristics of the underlying opinions including quality of analysis (Choi, Gulati &
Posner 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), nimbleness in writing (Vladeck 2005), and creativity
(Posner 2005).
If women lawyers ascend to the bench with fewer legal skills and are also more
risk averse than their male colleagues, as predicted under the Preference Story, female
judges should write less frequently cited opinions. If women are less likely than are their
male colleagues to have built up networks among lawyers and other judges then that
should also result in fewer citations.

And if the techniques of reasoning and the

perspectives of female judges are markedly different from those of male judges, then the
majority of judges (who are men) will likely prefer to cite opinions by male judges. In
contrast, we predict under the Selection Story that the opinions of female judges will
receive the same if not greater number of citations compared with male judges.
Beyond the Preference and Selection Stories, other predictions are possible.
Some may predict that women judges may receive a differential number of citations in
certain subject matter areas, also driven by stereotypes. If there is a perception that
women understand better and pay more attention to issues in certain areas that fall into
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what is considered a “women’s” domain such as family law or sex discrimination cases,
we would expect to see more citations to women there. Conversely, we would expect
fewer citations to female judges in areas such as business law.
c. Disagreement
Our third measure looks at the willingness of a judge to disagree with copartisans, either by dissenting against their opinions or writing majority opinions that
induce dissents—our measure of judicial independence. In calculating this measure, we
look at dissents–which are open and public statements of disagreements. We look first at
(1) the number of disagreements by a judge against co-partisans divided by the total
number of disagreements by the judge. This gives us a “raw” sense of how often a
particular judge is in open disagreement with co-partisans. A highly partisan judge, for
example, may never come in disagreement with a co-partisan (preferring to save her
dissents primarily for judges from the opposite political party). How often a judge
opposes a co-partisan, of course, will depend on the number of co-partisans on the same
bench. If a judge is the lone Democrat on a specific court, the judge will necessarily
oppose opposite party judges (due to the lack of any co-partisans). To control for court
composition, we look second at (2) the total number of majority opinions by co partisans
(opportunities to dissent) over the total number of majority opinions by all judges on the
court.9
We then define independence as the difference between (1) the number of
disagreements by a judge against co-partisans divided by the total number of
9

There are problems with this measure that we document at length in Choi, Gulati & Posner (2009a;
2009b; 2009c). Among those is that our measure does not work for the handful of states where all the
judges are of the same party. Accordingly, we drop those states from our independence calculations.
Further, as a function of the number of judges of each party on a court, the potential scores for a judge are
bounded. To adjust for this, we calculated a simpler alternate 0-1 measure of independence.
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disagreements by the judge and (2) the total number of majority opinions by co partisans
(opportunities to dissent) over the total number of majority opinions by all judges on the
court. A more negative score corresponds to a judge who writes opposing opinions
against opposite-party judges more frequently than the background pool of majority
opinions authored by opposite-party judges.

Conversely, a more positive score

corresponds to an authoring judge who writes opposing opinions less frequently against
opposite-party judges compared with the background pool of opinions (and thus more
frequently against co-partisans).
We treat a more positive score as indicative of a more independent judge. Others
might view disagreement among judges as a negative—a sign of disagreeability or
cantankerousness. Regardless of perspective, the prediction under the Preference Story is
that women will disagree less. Female judges, because they are less likely to be willing
to engage in open conflict, particularly with co-partisans, should—if the Preference Story
is correct—receive lower scores on our independence (or disagreeability) measure.
Further, their relatively lack of training (from discrimination in school and in the
workplace) in legal reasoning should also make them less willing to engage in conflict,
since their opponents (mostly men) will have greater skill and experience. In contrast,
the Selection Story predicts that women judges will receive a higher independence score.
To summarize, we have five predictions regarding gender differences to show up
in our measures if the Preference Story is correct. Female judges will publish fewer
opinions overall (Hypothesis 1), but more opinions on topics of specific interest to
women such as family law (Hypothesis 2). Female judges will be cited less overall
(Hypothesis 3), but more on topics of specific interest to women such as family law
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(Hypothesis 4).

Women will score lower on their willingness to disagree with co

partisans (Hypothesis 5). Three of these predictions (Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5) address the
question of whether female judges underperform their male counterparts. The other two
(Hypotheses 2 and 4) test whether (any) differential performance on the part of female
judges is explainable due to a specific subject matter focus on the part of female judges.
3.

DIFFERENT PATHWAYS
3.1. Education and Training
The Preference Story assumes that female judges have less experience and lower

quality training than male judges. We test whether this assumption is true. In our data
set, female judges have significantly worse educational credentials than do male judges.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics. The average U.S. News rank10 of the law
school attended by a male judge is approximately 52 and that for a woman judge is 62.11
The rankings difference is larger for undergraduate education, where the average college
ranking for a woman judge is 154 and that for male judge is 125.12 Men were also more
likely to attend graduate programs that offer LLMs for judges.13
[Insert Table 1 about here.]

3.2. Prior Professions
10

In order to have consistent and reliable information about the rankings of the schools that these judges
attended, we used data from 2002. US News and World Report data on college rankings is only available
back to 1983. In other words, we do not have information on the rankings at the time these judges attended
college and law school. Nonetheless, these rankings tend to be fairly stable over long periods of time.
11
The ten-point difference in JD rankings is statistically significant to the 0.0321 level.
12
The difference between male and female judge’s undergraduate college rankings has a p-value of 0.0023.
13
Two other variables that we also examined were judicial clerkships and membership of professional law
reform associations such as the American Law Institute. We find that men are more likely to have done
judicial clerkships, but the data is only available on a small group of judges. Obtaining a clerkship is not
only a sign of high performance in law school, but a source of legal training. On law association
membership, the numbers for women are significantly higher. To the extent these associations are sources
of training, they could add to a member’s human capital. We were unable to find any credible indications
in the literature, however, that membership of these organizations enhances human capital.
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Panel A of Table 1 reports the primary prior professions of these judges. One
might expect that women judges would come more often from public sector jobs,
consistent with the patterns for women lawyers more generally (Dau-Schmidt et al. 2007;
After the JD Study 2004). There are several possible explanations for why women are
likely to move to the public sector: first, women have more difficulty in tackling the
work-life conflict presented by modern law firm jobs (Garth & Sterling 2009). Second,
women – because of discrimination or less mentorship – are less likely to receive either
training or promotion in the law firm context (Garth & Sterling 2009). There is also
research on entering women law students suggesting that they are initially more
interested in public interest work than their male colleagues are (Dau-Schmidt et al.
2007). By the end of law school, however, the expectations of men and women students
appear to converge in favor of private sector jobs (Dau-Schmidt et al. 2007; Ku 2008).
Panel A of Table 1 reports that while 83.6% of male judges were in private practice, only
76.5% of female judges were. This difference however is not statistically significant.
3.2. Marriage, Children and Age
Background variables such as marriage and number of children, although not
necessarily part of the Preference Story, are potentially relevant control factors because
gender differences in these variables can have an impact on performance. Age is also a
potentially revealing variable in that younger judges are likely to have less experience
and training.
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The women in our data are less likely to be married as the men and more likely to
be divorced.14 This is consistent with the reports on women professionals, including
lawyers, where these women have both lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates
than their male counterparts (Wilson 2008).15 We find also that male judges have more
children than female judges. Reported in Panel A of Table 1, the average is one child for
the women versus just under two children for the men (t-test of difference significant
with a p-value of 0.000). Women also are less likely to have children than men (43% of
the women have children versus 57% of the men).16 These numbers are perhaps more
indicative of the Screening Story than the Preference Story: women who succeed at
becoming judges at a high level are those who have chosen to take fewer family
responsibilities over their careers.
In terms of age, the women in our sample attended and graduated from law school
later than their male colleagues. The average JD date for women is 1972 versus 1965 for
the men. Given the years of graduation, it is safe to assume that many of these women
likely faced significant barriers when they were law students; in 1972, women made up
only 10% of the JDs (Catalyst 2009). Law school environments were not welcoming of
women during the early 1970s, when their numbers were small (Epstein 1997). By
contrast, women currently make up close to 50% of law students (Catalyst 2009). The
women in our sample are also on average younger than their male counterparts are
14

65% of men are married, compared to 58% of women, a difference that is statistically significant to the
0.0167 level. 4.6% of men are divorced, compared to 5.6% of women, a difference that is not statistically
significant.
15
Lower marriage rates for women lawyers are also reported in the “After the JD” study for a cohort of
women significantly younger (roughly ages 27-32) than those in our judge sample (roughly ages 50-65)
(After the JD Study 2004).
16
For senior lawyers, in 2008, one estimate is that 80% of male lawyers had children as compared to
66.67% of women. The same article also reports that women with U.S. law degrees are significantly more
likely to be divorced than their male counterparts (roughly 10% of women with JDs versus 5% of men).
(Wilson 2008).
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(average age for the women is 64 and that for the men is 70). Comparing the judge’s age
at graduation from law school to their age when they become judges, we see that women
rise more quickly to judgeships; it takes female judges, on average, twenty-one years
from JD to judgeship, while takes male judges over twenty-six years.17 As a result,
women are younger (48 years old) than their male counterparts (51.5 years old) are when
they become state high court judges.18 We also find that women are older when they
graduate from law school, regardless of the year of graduation.

The foregoing is

consistent both with the Preference Story and with the Screening Story. Looking at the
Preference Story, the smaller pool of available women lawyers to choose from probably
meant that those selecting judges had to go deeper into the pool--hence, selecting female
judges who were younger and less experienced than are their male counterparts. On the
other hand, women who are overachievers might take less time to accomplish
professional goals, which fits the Screening Story.19
3.4. Type of Judicial Selection System
Finally, we examine the type of judicial selection systems most likely to yield
female judges. The bottom portion of Panel A of Table 1 reports that female judges are
most numerous in non-partisan election systems (and to a lesser extent, appointment
systems).20 It is hard to make much out of this, except perhaps that officials are more
likely to engage in affirmative action than is the public.
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The difference between the genders in time from JD to judgeship is statistically significant to the 0.00
level.
18
The difference in age in becoming a judge is statistically significant to the 0.01 level.
19
Women who graduated from law school prior to 1970 take 25 years to become a state high court judge,
compared to the 27 year for men with a JD from pre-1970, a difference which is significant to the 0.02
level. Women who graduated after 1970 take 18 years to become a judge, compared to the 19.7 for men, a
difference that is significant to the 0.01 level.
20
We do not dwell on these differences because, as an initial matter, we see no reason to expect gender
differences in performance to be exacerbated because of the type of judicial selection system. As explained
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4.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
4.1. Predictions of Gender Underperformance
Panel B of Table 1 reports the raw differences in publication rates, outside

citations and independence.21 Generally, men publish more, writing and publishing an
average of 26.15 opinions per year, while women write and publish 24.09 opinions per
year (difference significant at the 10% level).22 The difference is even greater when we
focus solely on published majority opinions. Male judges published 18.85 majority
opinions per year; female judges published only 16.78 majority opinions per year
(difference significant at the 5% level). However, women are cited23 more than their
male counterparts (0.81 outside state citations per opinion for women and 0.71 for men)24
and are more independent (both differences significant at the 1% level). 25 At the first
cut, then, women outperform men on two of three measures. However, the various states
differ in terms of the characteristics of their legal systems and the types of disputes they
receive. To say anything meaningful about gender differences, therefore, one has to
correct for state differences.
later, using state controls allows us to incorporate the effect of a variety of factors, including the selection
system.
21
We use slightly different levels of analysis for each of these measures: citations are measured at the
individual citation level; production is measure for each judge for each year; and independence is for each
judge with all years combined.
22
This difference is statistically significant to the 0.10 level.
23
We use citations from courts outside the state throughout the paper. We also test a variety of citation
types, including law reviews and dividing the citing court into types; women are cited at the same level or
more than their male counterparts are regardless of the type of court.
24
The difference between men and women’s citation rates is statistically significant to the 0.001 level.
25
The difference in independence levels (0.0093 for women, -0.0516 for men) is statistically significant to
the 0.001 level. A question that has been asked at workshops is whether the productivity numbers for
women are inflated by their writing many short concurrences and dissents (the unstated claim being that the
shorter opinions take less effort). To examine that question, we looked at page numbers of opinions
published as an alternate measure of productivity and found no significant gender differences. We also
examined the number of “yellow flags” and “red flags” on opinions for male and female judges and found
that women had more yellow flags (significant at the 10% level). Yellow flags in Westlaw signify the
presence of negative history for a case, suggesting that the reasoning in a case generated disagreement from
other judges). On red flags, however, there were no significant gender differences. Red flags indicate that
the case is no longer good for at least one point of law.
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[Insert Table 2 about here.]
To correct for the different characteristics of the states, which could include
differences in population, crime rates, court structures, judicial salaries, numbers of law
clerks and so on. Instead, to control for all differences we use a state-fixed-effects
estimation.26 We estimate the following equations using ordinary least squares
regressions on pooled judge-level data (Independence), judge-year level data
(Production), and opinion-level data (Citations):
Independence Model:
Independencei = α + ß1iFemale + State Fixed Effects
+ Year Fixed Effects + εi
Production Model:
ln(1+Majority_Opinions)i = α + ß1iFemale + State Fixed Effects
+ Year Fixed Effects + εi
Citation Model:
ln(1+Outside State Citationsi) = α + ß1iFemale +
+ State Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + εi
As Table 2 shows, once we correct for state fixed effects, the gender differences
for both publications and outside citations disappear, demonstrating that men and women
are performing at roughly the same levels.

Significant differences remain in the

independence regressions after inserting state controls, with female judges scoring higher
on independence. Thus far, our predictions (Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5) regarding female

26

Because there is no reason to expect big variations in these state-specific variables in the three years in
our sample (1998-2000), the fixed effects model should capture state differences.
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judges underperforming find little support in the data. If anything, female judges have
greater independence compared with their male counterparts.
To examine the question of who these men and women are further, we estimate
separate models for each of our measures with a variety of control variables.
4.2. Controlling for Backgrounds
The judges in our sample vary on a number of individual characteristics, all of
which might affect judicial outcomes. Some of these variables are proxies for human
capital such as education, years of experience or one’s primary prior profession being in
the private sector. An important element of the Preference Story is that the female
lawyers who become judges accumulate lower amounts of human capital during their
careers (from law school, private practice and so on) and, therefore, will not perform as
well as male judges. We find, as reported in Table 1, that women do indeed graduate
from lower ranked law schools and undergraduate institutions, have less experience on
the court or post-law school, and are generally younger. This suggests that the
assumptions underlying the Preference Story have support. However, our state fixedeffects models reported above provide a contrary outcome from the Preference Story.
These findings lead us to ask alternate questions about why we might see either
insignificant or positive effects for gender on our measures judicial quality. The first
question is whether the traditional measures of human capital, such as eliteness of legal
education and private practice experience, have purchase in the gender and judging
narrative?
If the answer is yes, that the Preference Story holds up, then we should expect to
find significance for background variables in our production, quality, and independence
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models. If the answer is no, and focusing on traditional measures of human capital is the
wrong approach, we should see no significant effects of any background variable in the
model. Table 3 displays how we tested which of the stories is correct.
We should note that the results reported already suggest that the Preference Story,
with its emphasis on traditional human capital measures, does not hold up. If it had, we
would have seen scores for women being significantly lower than those for men in our
state fixed effects models, but those differences would have disappeared when we
controlled for differences in levels of human capital acquisition (where, as reported,
women had less). Instead, we found that while women did have lower levels of human
capital (on the traditional measures), they still scored just as well as the men, even
without controlling for background differences.

The results reported below, which

control for background variables, confirm the initial indications that reject the Preference
Story.
Insert Table 3 about here
To each of our production, quality, and independence models, we add
independent variables for a variety of judge-level background factors, collectively
referred to as “judge controls.” Our “judge controls” include the following: whether the
judge was the chief judge of the high court (Chief Judge). A judge who is chief judge
may have less time to author opinions. The chief judge may also command greater
respect and receive greater numbers of citations as a result for her opinions.
Alternatively, the chief may be able to assign herself the more important opinions and
garner more citations that way (Langer, 2003). We include the number of years between
1998 and the year in which the judge received her law degree (Post Law-School
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Experience) and the number of years the judge has been on the high court (Court
Experience). More experienced judges may decide opinions with greater skill, leading to
more citations. We include variables for whether a judge retired from the bench in 2001
or earlier and 0 otherwise (Retirement Close).
We also include a number of variables specific to the background of the
individual judge measured as of 2000. These include the age of the judge (Age), whether
the judge was married (Married), the judge’s number of children (Number of Children),
whether the judge was divorced (Divorced), and whether the judge’s primary experience
before becoming a judge was in private practice (Private Practice). We include the
PAJID score for each judge as developed by Brace, Hall, and Langer (2000). These
scores locate judges on a political continuum from highly conservative (0) to highly
liberal (100). We lastly include variables relating to the judge’s education including the
U.S. News ranking of the Judge’s law school measured in 2002 (US News JD Ranking),
and whether the judge went to an in-state law school (In-State Law School.)
4.2.1. Publications
In the model for production with judge controls (reported in Column 1 of Table
3), with the log of the number of majority opinions as the dependent variable, Female
remains insignificant. For all judges, whether the judge was the chief judge and whether
the judge was close to retirement turn out to be relevant; both have a negative effect on
publication rates. This is not surprising, as chief judges have additional responsibilities,
while a judge who is close to retirement may be slowing down. The years-on-the-court
variable has a positive effect, suggesting that publishing is a learned skill. None of the
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traditional human capital measures, such as prior employment, law or undergraduate
school rankings are significant.
4.2.3. Citations
We next turn to an examination of outside state citations to majority opinions with
the addition of judge control variables to the model.27 Results are reported in Column 2
of Table 3.

Looking at all the judges, we see that Female remains insignificant.

Moreover, except for chief judge none of the judge “control” variables are significant.
The coefficient on Chief Judge is negative and significant at the 10% level. Judges who
serve as chief judge receive significantly fewer outside state citations per opinion. Again,
as with the production model, the human capital measures are insignificant.
4.2.4. Independence
We see in Column 3 of Table 2 that the coefficient on Female in the regression
with the judge-controls while positive is now not significantly different from zero.28 To
summarize, the above three sets of findings are inconsistent with Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5.
Indeed, we find little support for the Preference Story, as almost none of the background
variables are significant.
Overall, all these findings suggest that women serving on state supreme courts are
either able to overcome their lack of training, or that the job of being a state high court
judge simply does not require skills learned in elite law schools and private practice.
These results call into question the focus on traditional measures of human capital in
predicting the performance of female (and male) judges.
27

The level of analysis here is the individual citation, so the number of observations is much higher. We
have also included state, subject matter, and year controls.
28
We also included a control for the ideology of the judge, the PAJID measure borrowed from our political
science colleagues (Brace, Langer & Hall 2000). Theoretically, women could simply be more liberal than
their male partisan counterparts, which could drive the difference in independence.
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4.2.5. Predictions of Differential Interests
Our next two Hypotheses (2 and 4) draw upon the idea that women might have
different subject area interests than men and, therefore, might invest effort in law making
in different areas than men. One possible criticism of our results is that women are on
par with men only because they excel in certain traditionally female-focused areas of law
(such as family law). Outside of these areas, the Preference Story may still prevail. To
examine this question, we examined publication and citation numbers as a function of
specific subject areas.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 reports summary statistics on the number of majority opinions published per year
categorized by gender and by subject matter (see Appendix for definition of subject
matter categories).

We find a wide variety of significant differences with simple

difference of means tests. Generally, female judges publish fewer majority opinions in
Administrative, Commercial, Labor, and the Other categories of cases. Some of these
differences may be driven by underlying differences in case loads across the different
states and other factors. To control for this, we estimate a regression model using the log
of the number of published majority opinions within a subject matter category as the
dependent variable and include Female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as
independent variables. Table 4 reports that in the multivariate model, Female judges
publish fewer majority opinions in the Church, Criminal, First Amendment, and Labor
categories. Based on these models, women do seem to publish less than men in several
areas. But none of these were as predicted (as “traditional” female-focused subject
matter areas under Hypothesis 2), suggesting the possibility that these findings are no
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more than noise. Moreover, there is no indication that women are publishing more cases
in the Family law area. Hypothesis 2, in sum, seems to have little support.
Turning to Hypothesis 4, we examine whether women are cited less or more in
specific subject areas. As women may been seen as experts in areas relating to family
law or gender based rights, we expect that women will be cited more in these areas, but
less in areas such as business law that are outside of women’s stereotypical domain.
Looking first at the average number of outside state citations per majority case published
in each subject area, we see that women are cited more often than men in cases relating to
the Capital and Family law cases.29
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
We estimate ordinary least square models with the log of 1 plus the number of
outside state citations to majority opinions for each subject matter separate with gender,
judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables. We find that
Female gender is not significant in any of these models in explaining the number of
outside state citations. The initial summary statistics suggest mild support for Hypothesis
4, in that women are cited more than men in family law. But that mild support disappears
once the regressions are estimated. Further, female judges are not cited significantly less
than are their male counterparts in any subject area, suggesting that other judges view
female judge’s opinions as holding the same weight as their male counterparts’ opinions.
Not only do female judges do just as well as male judges in the aggregate, they do so
even at the level of specific subject matter areas.
5.

29

Gender in the Federal Courts

Men are cited more in areas that fall outside the basic subject areas (the “other” category).
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To evaluate whether our results are unique to the state high courts, where there is
tremendous variation in terms of court systems and state effects, we report data on the
federal courts of appeals and district courts for roughly the same time periods (1998-00
for the courts of appeal and 2001-02 for the district courts). Owing to constraints in the
datasets, we are able to estimate gender comparisons only on a subset of the hypotheses.
Further, because of the relatively small size of the appeals court dataset, we were unable
to use as many controls as we did with the state court data. To bring matters full circle,
we report preliminary data on Judge Sotomayor while she was on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals (for the years 2004-06).
5.1 Appeals Courts
The data for the Courts of Appeals, collected for a prior project (Choi & Gulati
2004) has information for all the active circuit court judges during the period 1998 to
2000 who had been on the bench at least two years and were under the age of 65 at the
time. Data was collected for the same three measures: majority opinion publication,
outside federal circuit citations to majority opinions, and co-partisan disagreements.30 We
estimate regressions with controls for circuit effects since the circuits likely differ in both
behavioral norms and caseloads.
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
Generally, we find that female appeals judges are slightly less likely to be cited by judges
from outside their circuit, but have roughly the same rates of publication and
independence as male judges. We also see similar patterns, in terms of background, to
what we found in the state high courts. Compared to the men, women at the federal
30

We did not have data on subject areas, so as to be able to test whether there were gender differences in
the types of cases the judges wrote opinions or received citations in. Also because of the small number of
female judges, we were unable to meaningfully test critical mass effects.
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appellate level attended less prestigious colleges and law schools, were less likely to have
their primary prior background be in private practice, and were younger when appointed
to the bench.31
5.2 District Court
For the district courts, we used data for the approximately 575 federal district
judges who were active in the 2001-02 period.32 Because these judges sit individually,
we are unable to calculate independence scores in a fashion similar to the state high
courts. As with the federal appeals courts, we used circuit controls to adjust for possible
differences in norms.33
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
We find significant gender differences in both publication rates and outside
federal circuit citation rates, with women outperforming men. Unlike with the state high
courts and the federal appeals courts, we do not find significant gender differences in
terms of the judge background as measured by our judge controls (prestige of college,
law school, experience in private practice, and age) in the district courts.
5.3. Judge Sotomayor Versus the Others
As Judge Sotomayor’s statements and the reactions they generated were the
starting point for our project, we examined data on her as well. Initially, to take
advantage of our dataset from 1998-00, we examined her performance in roughly
comparable years (1999-01). Roughly speaking, her scores would have put her in the
31

As might be expected, given relative prestige levels of the court systems, the federal appeals court judges
tended to have attended more prestigious colleges and law schools as compared to the state high court
judges.
32
There were approximately 650 district court judges who were active during the 2001-02 period. Owing
to incomplete data on approximately 75 of these judges, however, we estimated our results only for the 575
for whom we have complete data. We are in the process of filling in the data on the remaining 75.
33
We also estimated these regressions with district level controls, given possible variations in caseloads
across districts. The basic gender results remain the same.
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bottom half of the judges on citation and publication scores. The problem with this
comparison though was that she only joined the bench in 1999 and we were comparing
her to a set of judges, all of whom had at least two years of experience on the bench
(Posner 2009a).
To estimate a more meaningful comparison, we calculated outside federal circuit
citation and majority opinion publication scores for Judge Sotomayor for 2004-06. As a
control, we estimated scores for six court of appeals judges who were rumored either to
have been on President Obama’s short list or President Bush’s short list. In addition, we
also included two other Second Circuit judges who were active during the same period,
judges Calabresi and Raggi.
[Insert Table 8 About Here.]
The comparisons here are necessarily rough because there aren’t enough judges to control
for factors such as circuit effects. That said, Judge Sotomayor’s citation scores (from
both judges outside her circuit and academics) are among the highest of any of the judges
in either president’s short list (Posner 2009b; cf. also Anderson 2009).
6.

Conclusion
We find little to no support for Preference Story’s predictions that female judges

would underperform male judges (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5), as formed from the extant
literature.

Indeed, the prediction that women will underperform men in terms of

independence scores was patently false.

Women were more independent than men

(directly contradicting Hypothesis 5), supporting the Selection Story. We also find that
the equivalent performance of women and men judges is not driven by any specific
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subject matter area effects (refuting Hypotheses 2 and 4). Women judges do not perform
well because of outsized performance in traditionally women-focused subjects.
Perhaps our most striking finding is that the premise of the Preference Story is
true (female judges have weaker credentials and less experience) but its conclusion is
false (female judges and male judges perform about the same). What might account for
this outcome?
First, the measures of credential and experience might be inaccurate. We have
been told by some female judges that they went to lower-rank law schools in order to
accommodate their husbands but did very well while at those schools. Our measures do
not capture this phenomenon—that, for example, the type of woman who becomes a
judge may be highly intelligent or motivated. It might also be the case that the rank of
the law school, a few extra years of practice, and so forth, make little difference for the
quality of judging.
Second, the measures of performance might be inaccurate. As we noted before,
our measures of performance might not capture high-quality judicial performance. If so,
we have a “garbage-in, garbage-out” problem.
Third, it is possible that, as Justice Sotomayor suggested before backtracking,
women are naturally more gifted judges than men are.

The various psychological

differences between men and women might favor women, so that even if women have
less training and experience, they end up being superior judges. It might also be the case
that women’s experiences give them a distinctive perspective that enhances their judicial
talents.
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To conclude, a couple of points regarding gaps in our analysis are in order. First,
although we frame the threshold question in terms of the value of gender diversity, we
only get at that question indirectly. Judges on the state high courts always sit in teams.
Hence, an estimation of the value of gender diversity would compare the performance of
gender diverse teams versus those of homogenous teams. These comparisons could be
run in terms of various citations scores and perhaps also reversal rates.
Second, there are likely inter-generational differences embedded within the
reported gender differences. Specifically, the performance predictions for the female
judges who attended law school in the late 1960s and early 1970s may be different
compared with those who attended law school one decade later, in the early 1980s and
yet different again for those who were in school in the early 90s. Our dataset was not
large enough to make these comparisons, but we hope to remedy this problem in later
research.
To conclude, across a variety of courts, in an analysis of over 1000 judges, over
multiple years, we find that women do just as well as the men in terms of basic judging
measures. Further, female judges do not seem to demonstrate significant differences in
the types of subject areas they are interested in, at least not in any fashion obviously
connected to gender.
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Table 1
Panel A: Background Characteristics
Men

Women

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev

p-value

Chief Judge

0.1809

0.0221

0.1667

0.0371

0.7451

Court Experience

7.9342

0.4188

4.8039

0.5441

0.0001

Post-Law School Experience

32.8942

0.4835

25.7660

0.8556

0.0000

Close To Retirement

0.3750

0.0278

0.1863

0.0387

0.0004

Age

58.5809

0.4851

52.9314

0.7933

0.0000

Private Practice

0.8355

0.0213

0.7647

0.0422

0.9975

PAJID

36.9277

1.2898

38.8382

2.2411

0.4579

US News BA Ranking

124.6352

4.9459

154.2937

10.3061

0.0023

US News JD Ranking

52.4013

2.3747

62.8700

4.5186

0.0321

In-State School

0.6213

0.0280

0.6000

0.0492

0.7057

Married

0.6494

0.0164

0.5778

0.0301

0.0167

Children

1.9141

0.0659

1.0556

0.0822

0.0000

Divorced

0.0459

0.0072

0.0556

0.0140

0.2592

LLM

0.1255

0.3319

0.0753

0.2653

0.9063

Prestigious Membership

0.4869

0.5006

0.5340

0.5013

0.2050

Appointed

0.1993

0.4001

0.2524

0.4365

0.1280

Merit Selection

0.3300

0.4710

0.2233

0.4185

0.9792

Non-Partisan Elections

0.2614

0.4401

0.3689

0.4849

0.0187

Partisan Elections

0.2092

0.4073

0.1553

0.3639

0.8826

Selection Method
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Panel B: Gender and Production, Citations, and Independence
Men

Women

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev

p-value

Number of Total Published
Opinions per Year

26.145

0.598

24.086

0.938

0.0792

Number of Published
Majority Opinions per Year

18.846

11.909

16.783

10.209

0.0112

Number of Outside State
Citations per Majority
Opinion

0.7084

0.0148

0.8138

0.0295

0.0009

Independence Score

-0.0516

0.0118

0.0093

0.0190

0.0087
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Table 2
Gender and Production, Outside Citations, and Independence

Female
Constant

Independence

Production:
ln(Majority
Opinions Per Year)

0.0641**
(3.29)

-0.0507
(-1.21)

Citations:
ln(1+Number of
Outside State
Citations to
Majority Opinions)
-0.000159
(-0.02)

-0.0252
(-0.62)

2.979**
(34.08)

0.293**
(7.65)

Subject Matter Controls
No
No
Yes
State-Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
N
350
1067
19473
R2
0.299
0.481
0.085
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Subject matter controls include indicator
variables for the following case subject matter areas: administrative, Attorney and Client, Capital
Punishment, Church and State, Commercial, Criminal, Family, First Amendment, Labor, Property, Rights,
and Torts (with Other as the base category). The subject matter areas are defined in the Appendix. Opinion
level controls include the number of dissents against the majority opinion, the number of West key pages,
and the length of the opinion in pages.
Independence is defined as the Opposite_Pool – Opposite_Party. Opposite_Party is the number of
opposing opinions written against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing opinions
written against a judge of either the opposite or same party from 1998 to 2000. Opposite Pool is the total
number of majority opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority
opinions authored by either an opposite or same party judge from 1998 to 2000. Independence_Indicator is
defined as 1 if Independence is greater or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. Only judges for whom we could
identify a political party were included in the analysis. We exclude judges from states where all judges in
our sample were of the same political party from the analysis (Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, South
Carolina, South Dakota).
The quality measure is the average number of Outside State Citations per majority opinion. Outside
Federal Court includes all citations from a federal district or circuit court located in a circuit that does not
contain the state in question. Other State Court includes all citations from state courts outside of the state
in question. US Supreme Court includes all citations from the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside State
Citations is the sum of Outside Federal Court + Other State Court + US Supreme Court. All citations are
from the LEXIS Shepard’s database and are tracked up until January 1, 2007. Law Review Citations are
for law reviews as tracked by the LEXIS Shepard’s database (until January 1, 2007).
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Table 3
Gender and Production, Outside Citations, and Independence with Judge Controls
Independence

Production:
ln(Majority
Opinions Per Year)

0.0809**
(3.62)

-0.0672
(-1.31)

Citations:
ln(1+Number of
Outside State
Citations to
Majority Opinions)
0.00120
(0.10)

Chief Judge

-0.0071
(-0.28)

-0.133**
(-2.59)

-0.0176
(-1.51)

Court Experience

0.0021
(1.04)

0.0110*
(2.50)

-0.000177
(-0.20)

Post-Law School Experience

0.0001
(0.08)

0.000382
(0.06)

-0.00186+
(-1.72)

Retirement Close

0.0271
(1.11)

-0.147**
(-3.56)

0.00669
(0.59)

Age

0.0001
(0.05)

0.000479
(0.07)

0.000464
(0.46)

Married

0.0286
(1.05)

-0.0378
(-0.70)

-0.00106
(-0.08)

-0.00338
(-0.37)

0.00364
(0.23)

0.00263
(0.70)

Divorced

0.0638
(1.58)

-0.0154
(-0.20)

-0.00360
(-0.18)

Private Practice

-0.0344
(-1.04)

0.0498
(0.82)

0.00885
(0.64)

PAJID

0.00004
(0.07)

0.000275
(0.27)

0.000300
(1.26)

US News JD Ranking

-0.0006
(-1.64)

0.000344
(1.48)

-0.000158
(-1.08)

In-State Law School

0.0286
(1.18)

-0.0309
(-0.64)

0.0213+
(1.82)

-0.00460
(-0.04)

2.802**
(10.92)

0.292**
(4.99)

Female

Number of Children

Constant

Subject Matter Controls
No
No
Yes
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
N
327
943
18433
R2
0.339
0.534
0.087
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Subject matter controls include indicator
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variables for the following case subject matter areas: administrative, Attorney and Client, Capital
Punishment, Church and State, Commercial, Criminal, Family, First Amendment, Labor, Property, Rights,
and Torts (with Other as the base category). The subject matter areas are defined in the Appendix.
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Table 4
Gender and Subject Matter Differences in Production
Number of Majority
Opinions Per Year Men
1.354

Number of Majority
Opinions Per Year Women
1.139

p-value

Female Significant
In Full Model?34

0.0389

No

Attorney

0.578

0.566

0.8574

No

Capital

0.738

0.629

0.2643

No

Church

0.006

0.000

0.1993

Yes, Negative

Commercial

2.809

2.386

0.0311

No

Criminal

6.162

5.562

0.1386

Yes, Negative

Family

1.417

1.457

0.7938

No

First Amendment

0.062

0.037

0.1506

Yes, Negative

Labor

1.565

1.270

0.0157

Yes, Negative

Property

1.156

1.015

0.2047

No

Rights

0.298

0.330

0.5363

No

Torts

2.296

2.097

0.2206

No

Other

0.405

0.296

0.0668

No

Total

18.846

16.783

0.0112

No

Administrative

34

Each model used the number of citations for cases in each subject area as the dependent variable, with
Female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables. This column indicates
whether the Female gender variable is a significant predictor of the level of citations from outside the state
a case receives, and whether the variable has a positive or negative effect.
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Table 5
Gender and Subject Matter Differences in Citation Rates
Number of outside
state citations per
opinion - Men
0.452

Number of outside
state citations per
opinion - Women
0.488

Attorney

0.707

Capital
Church

p-value

Female Significant
In Full Model?35

0.6787

No

0.736

0.8430

No

0.786

1.170

0.0067

No

--

--

--

--

Commercial

0.983

1.133

0.1983

No

Criminal

0.662

0.716

0.2759

No

Family

0.625

0.939

0.0064

No

First Amendment

1.191

1.182

0.9874

No

Labor

0.436

0.478

0.6529

No

Property

0.455

0.536

0.2908

No

Rights

1.203

0.976

0.4931

No

Torts

0.954

1.056

0.2855

No

Other

0.471

0.662

0.2471

No

Total

0.708

0.814

0.0009

No

Administrative

There were no majority opinions authored by a Female judge in the Church category.

35

Each model used the number of outside state citations for majority cases in each subject area as the
dependent variable, with Female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables.
As with the publication table, this column indicates whether the Female gender variable is a significant
predictor of the level of citations from outside the state a case receives, and whether the variable has a
positive or negative effect.
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Table 6
Appeals Data
Independence
Gender

-0.00988
(-0.22)

Production
(Majority Opinions)
-0.0654
(-1.13)

Constant

-0.0515
(-0.42)

4.554**
(44.00)

8.056**
(51.26)

Yes
98
0.639

Yes
98
0.649

Circuit-Level Controls
Yes
N
98
R2
0.141
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Outside Federal
Circuit Citations
-0.168+
(-1.76)

	
  

Table 7
District Court Data
	
  

Gender
Constant

Production
(Majority Opinions)
0.2792*
(2.09)

Outside Federal
Circuit Citations
0.0552**
(3.01)

2.0839**
(6.26)

0.535**
(14.10)

Circuit-Level Controls
Yes
N
[575]
R2
0.639
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Yes
8781
0.03
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Table 8
Sotomayor Data	
  
Production
Outside Federal Circuit
(Majority Opinions)
Citations
2004-2006
Calabresi

72

784

Clement

81

240

Garland

65

264

Garza

112

255

Jones

77

335

Lynch

215

998

McConnell

119

630

McKeown

67

404

Raggi

53

438

Schroeder

60

120

Sotomayor

90

706

Wardlaw

51

207

Wilkinson

88

537

Williams

123

397

Wood

156

831

Sotomayor

73

1999-2001
280
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APPENDIX
Judge-Level Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Chief Judge

For year-level data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in
question is the chief judge of the court in the year in question and 0
otherwise. For pooled data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge
in question is the chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to
2000 and 0 otherwise.

Court Experience

For year-level data, the difference between the year in question and
the year the judge first joined the high court. For pooled data, the
difference between 1998 and the year the judge first joined he high
court (if the judge started on the court in 1998 or later court
experience is set to 0).

Post-Law School Experience

The difference between 1998 and the year the judge graduated law
school.

Retirement Close

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question retired from the
bench in 2001 or earlier and 0 otherwise.

Age

Age of the judge in years.

Married

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is married as of the year
2000 and 0 otherwise.

Number of Children

The number of children a judge had as of the year 2000.

Divorced

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is divorced as of the year
2000 and 0 otherwise.

Private Practice

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge had private practice
experience before becoming a judge and 0 otherwise.

PAJID Score

PAJID score for each judge as developed by Brace, Hall & Langer
(2000). These scores locate judges on a political continuum from
highly conservative (0) to highly liberal (100).

US New JD Ranking

The US News rankings of the judge’s law school measured as of
2002

In-State Law School

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is went to an in-state law
school and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX - continued
Subject Matter Categories
Variable

Definition

Administrative

Review of Agency/Government Decisionmaking (not in another
subject matter category). Also includes Government Actions (e.g.,
State suit to comply with state statute that does not fit in other
categories); private actions suing state actors for negligence, etc
(unless the case involves prisoner rights which is included in the
“Criminal” category of cases).

Attorney and Client

Attorney Misconduct; Attorney fees (unless fits in one of above
categories); Disbarment; Contempt of court order against attorney.

Capital Punishment

Capital Punishment-related actions.

Church and State

Pledge of Allegiance; Funding for Private Religious Schools; Prayer
in School; Ten Commandments.

Commercial

Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; LessorLessee; Usury Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; Employment
Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing the Corporate Veil;
Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of mechanics lien; Implied warrant of
merchantability.

Criminal

Sentencing Guidelines; Prisoners Rights; Murder; Rape;
Drugs/Controlled Substances; Attorney-Client Privilege in Criminal
Context; Grand Jury-related; Juvenile Criminals. Excludes Capital
Punishment cases.

Family

Divorce; Adoption; Child Support; Probate/Inheritance.

First Amendment

Employment issues (excluding employment contractual disputes);
ERISA; National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA);
Wrongful Discharge; Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA);
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits;
Worker’s Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims.

Labor

Employment issues (excluding (1) employment contractual disputes
that are not Workers Comp or state administrative wage rate
related—these go to “Commercial” and (2) excluding discriminationtype claims that fit in “Civil Rights”); ERISA; NLRB; Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA);
Wrongful Discharge; Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA);
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits;
Worker's Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims; State
Wage Rate Claims.

Property

Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property LicensingRelated or Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-Related.

Rights

Race Discrimination; Sex Discrimination; Affirmative Action; Civil
Rights; Age Discrimination; Privacy; Handicap Discrimination;
Abortion (includes discrimination in employment context cases);
Voting Rights-Voting Related.

50

Torts

Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; Products Liability;
Wrongful Death; Libel; etc.

Other

All other cases.
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